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INTRODUCTION
There is surely no more appropriate context in which to discuss
interdisciplinary approaches to civil procedure than in a festschrift honoring
Stephen Burbank. In a diverse and expansive set of writings spanning several
decades, Burbank has drawn on a wide range of disciplines and methods in
approaching key questions of procedure. Masterful at delivering rigorous and
precise legal analysis, he has also acquired deep knowledge and sophistication
in a range of allied fields, including history and political science. This has
enabled him to utilize various qualitative and quantitative methods in pursuit
of the deeper social meaning and purposes of the law. As he has insisted, “the
technical reasoning required to be a master of doctrine is a necessary
† Lewis Talbot and Nadine Hearn Shelton Professor of International Legal Studies and
Professor (by courtesy) of History, Stanford University. Many thanks to Bob Bone, Bernie Meyler,
Ed Purcell, Judith Resnik and Diego Zambrano for their helpful questions and comments and to the
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condition for . . . good scholarship about procedure,” but “it is not a sufficient
condition.”1 For those who “seek to understand law’s significance,” it is vital
to gain “perspectives in addition to the internal logic of technical
reasoning”2—and these can be supplied only by turning to disciplines beyond
the law, “including history, empiricism, and . . . political science.”3
Among Burbank’s interdisciplinary pursuits, and dear to my own heart, is
the study of procedure from a historical perspective. But what precisely does
history contribute? Unlike the quantitative methods employed by empiricists
and widely embraced as the leading edge of both social science and legal
studies today, the historian’s toolkit is more amorphous and the ensuing
contribution harder to identify. As Burbank’s own work powerfully suggests,
what history affords, above all else, is much-needed context. As he has often
observed, procedure is power, providing the terms and structuring the
processes through which decisions of vast individual and social consequence
are made.4 But it is all too easy, “[p]articularly when the law in question is
labeled ‘procedure’ . . . to accept a doctrinal question at face value (that is, to
regard doctrine as an end in itself).”5 The unfortunate end result of this
tendency, he has cautioned, is “to view such a question apart from the
litigation dynamics that it engenders, and otherwise to ignore issues of power
that may be at stake in its resolution.”6 It is here that history can be of
particular use, revealing the social context that elucidates these vital power
dynamics, and thus making clear the stakes of our procedural choices.
As evidenced by Burbank’s scholarship, as well as that of others
participating in this symposium, historical approaches to procedure are of
interest to procedure scholars. But as is true across the legal academy and
broader university, enthusiasm for the historical method pales in comparison
to that for empirical social science. Among legal scholars, the most obvious
exception to that generalization is the relatively small but thriving field of
legal history, many of whose participants are not only trained as lawyers, but
also hold doctorates in history. But if we look at the work produced by those
who identify as legal historians, remarkably little concerns questions of civil
procedure and practice. Although legal historical work abounds in such fields
as administrative law, labor and employment, and criminal law and procedure,
Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics, and Power, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342, 343 (2002).
Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary
View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1440-41 (2008).
3 Burbank, Procedure, Politics, and Power, supra note 1, at 344.
4 See generally Burbank, Procedure, Politics, and Power, supra note 1; see Burbank, Procedure and
Power, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 513 (1996); Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American
Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 116-20 (2009); Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1463, 1471-76 (1987).
5 Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act, supra note 2, at 1441.
6 Id.
1
2
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the same cannot be said of civil procedure.7 Shaped by the realist turn in
American approaches to law and legal education, as well as by their training
in history, U.S.-based legal historians—unlike their counterparts in much of
the rest of the globe—are largely externalist in orientation, eager to focus on
the lived experience of the law, rather than its formal trappings. From this
perspective, procedure and its technicalities seem far removed from the social
and political dynamics believed to matter. But if we take seriously Burbank’s
repeated insistence that procedure is power, we are left with no small irony.
Just as procedure scholars can be tempted to ignore history in their rush to
analyze doctrine in its own terms, ignoring the social context that reveals the
underlying reality of power, so too many historians—in their pursuit of the
social context that proceduralists sometimes ignore—are inclined to ignore
procedure. The nexus of procedure and history, where power dynamics play
out through the law, is thus all too often neglected, to the ultimate detriment
of scholarship in both fields.
As this suggests, we need more histories of procedure. In so arguing, I
mean to make not only a quantitative, but also a qualitative point. Our need,
in other words, is not only for more books and articles examining the history
of procedure, but also for more of the historian’s distinctive sensibility in the
work that is produced. What precisely is that sensibility? Emerging out of the
intersection of critical legal studies and cultural history, the legal historical
scholarship produced in the United States over the last several decades has
focused on context and contingency. By setting historical events in context,
the legal historian reveals the myriad contingencies undergirding past
developments, thus shedding light on the often complicated and
unpredictable nature of legal and social change—including, not least, the role
played by complex dynamics of power.8 Of late, a number of scholars have
grown frustrated with the reigning paradigm, arguing, in the words of
Christopher Tomlins, that the embrace of “totalized contingency” has proven
a dead end, giving rise to a growing sense of “indeterminacy” and replacing
“explanation” with “an aesthetic of ‘complexity.’”9 But despite the rise of such
critiques and the call for a new paradigm, one has yet to emerge. Legal
historians as a whole remain committed to pursuing context and contingency.

7 There are, of course, exceptions. See, e.g., KELLEN FUNK, THE LAWYERS’ CODE
(forthcoming 2021); AMALIA D. KESSLER, INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE, 1800–1877 (2017) (presenting historical
accounts of the development of American procedural law).
8 See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984) (describing
the various approaches to historical analysis within the field of critical legal studies).
9 Christopher Tomlins, Revolutionary Justice in Brecht, Conrad, and Blake, 21 L AW & L IT .
185, 204 (2009).
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There are, no doubt, many reasons for this persistence—including
perhaps, as Tomlins has put it, the fact that the field is “obdurately
atheoretical.”10 In addition, however, I suspect that many legal historians
doubt that attending to contexts and contingencies necessarily leads to
“totalized contingency.” Even while tracing particular contingent pathways of
development, the legal historian can identify deeper, structural and
institutional forces that also shaped past events and that were less subject to
possible change. Deployed in this way, the historical focus on context and
contingency can have great explanatory force. It is true, to some extent, that
a focus on a different set of contexts might shine light on a different set of
causes, thus leading us back to the problem of indeterminacy. But the valueadded of history is not that it is a social science that purports to present us
with definitive, falsifiable accounts of legal and social development. It is
instead an interpretive discipline that opens up new and important lines of
inquiry that we might not otherwise even have known to consider.
To call for more of the historian’s sensibility in the writing of legal
histories of procedure and practice is thus, ultimately, to call for more and
broader contextualization. But what exactly does this mean? As I see it, there
are three deeply interrelated components to the pursuit of historical
contextualization: identifying a broad range of relevant contexts, reading
widely in the primary sources (beyond the immediate legislative history of a
particular rule or statute of interest), and perhaps most importantly, retaining
an imaginative openness to the strangeness of the past. These are not
sequential moves that provide a formulaic method or recipe to be
systematically applied, but are instead better understood as the constitutive
components of an overarching frame of mind. Thus, insight that a particular
context ought to be explored might lead the legal historian to examine a
broader range of sources than initially contemplated. But so too, reading
widely in the sources might bring to light a relevant context that had not
previously been considered. And throughout this iterative process of
identifying contexts and reading sources, the legal historian must retain a
degree of imaginative openness, since without that, potentially relevant
contexts and sources might not even be recognized as such.
But this is all far too abstract. To try to make more concrete the ways in
which the historian’s sensibility might contribute to legal historical
scholarship on procedure, I will focus the remainder of my remarks on an
example drawn from my current work on the history of modern American
arbitration law and practice.

10 Christopher Tomlins, What is Left of the Law and Society Paradigm after Critique? Revisiting
Gordon’s “Critical Legal Histories”, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 155, 155 (2012).
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I. CONTEXTUALIZING THE RISE OF MODERN AMERICAN
ARBITRATION
Given the highly contested and ever-expanding practice of binding,
mandatory arbitration, arbitration law is one of those subjects in the broader
field of civil procedure and practice to which some historical work has in fact
been devoted. The work produced to date has taken two main forms. One
line of inquiry explores the legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act
of 1925 (FAA). Highlighting the role of commercial interests in lobbying for
the statute, this research suggests that these interests envisioned arbitration
as a device for resolving commercial disputes between parties of roughly
equal bargaining power and never contemplated that it would be deployed, as
today, through contracts of adhesion drafted by large corporations and
imposed on millions of consumers and employees.11 A second line of inquiry
examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s caselaw interpreting the FAA over the
decades since the statute was first enacted, emphasizing, in particular, the
extent to which the court has refashioned core underpinnings of the legal
framework first put into place (including through its own decisions), even
while continuing to insist on purported interpretive continuity.12
While this work has been valuable, it only begins to scratch the surface of
what a deeply contextualized, historical approach might bring to bear. How
then might we expand our vision? One initial possibility is to offer a more
deeply contextualized account of the FAA itself, extending beyond its
immediate legislative history and subsequent interpretation. Although
relatively rare, some of the most promising work in the field has been in this
direction. Consider, for example, Katherine Van Wezel Stone’s argument that
the enactment of various state arbitration statutes and the FAA in the 1920s
should be understood in relation to the associationalist vision of the state
11 See generally IMRE STEPHEN SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN
ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA (2013). This reading of history has also been cited as a
justification for legislation that would prevent the enforcement of pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate consumer and employment disputes. See also Arbitration Fairness Act, H.R. 1873, 112th
Cong. § 402(a) (2011) (The FAA “was intended to apply to disputes between commercial entities
of generally similar sophistication and bargaining power.”); Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.
Ct. 1612, 1642-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The legislative hearings and debate leading up to the
FAA’s passage evidence Congress’ aim to enable merchants of roughly equal bargaining power to
enter into binding agreements to arbitrate commercial disputes . . . . The FAA’s legislative history
also shows that Congress did not intend the statute to apply to arbitration provisions in
employment contracts.”).
12 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Stephanie Garlock & Annie J. Wang, Collective Preclusion and
Inaccessible Arbitration: Data, Non-Disclosure, and Public Knowledge, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 611,
619-26 (2020); Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in
the Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE. L. J. 2804, 2855-73 (2015); see generally THOMAS E.
CARBONNEAU, TOWARD A NEW FEDERAL LAW OF ARBITRATION (2014); J. Maria Glover,
Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L. J. 3052 (2015).
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advanced by Herbert Hoover in his capacity as Secretary of Commerce, as
typified by his effort to promote trade associations. As she notes, Hoover
urged the development of what historian Ellis Hawley has described as an
“associative state”—one in which government would facilitate the
development of trade associations, professional organizations and other group
forms and encourage these to share research and expertise, develop common
standards, and otherwise work together to promote a more efficient and
humane mode of capitalism.13 By situating the emergence of the FAA (whose
enactment Hoover supported) against the backdrop of this associationalist
project of governance, Van Wezel Stone suggests that the statute was
designed to facilitate the ability of groups—envisioned as “normative
communities” sharing core values and interests—to resolve their own internal
disputes and thereby engage in self-governance. The FAA was thus never
intended to apply, as it does now, to relations between those who do not
inhabit the same normative community—as is the case, for example, of large
corporations and their consumers.14
Hiro Aragaki and Imre Szalai have also done important work
contextualizing the FAA—in their case by identifying the parallels between
arguments for the reform of statutory arbitration and the broader
Progressive-era campaign for procedural reform. As they note, the campaign
for procedural reform emerged from lawyers’ widespread perception that a
crisis had arisen in access to justice, as courts, inherited from an earlier era,
proved unable to handle the vast influx of cases generated by rapid
industrialization and urbanization.15 From this perspective, Aragaki explains,
the FAA was not intended, as assumed today, to advance contractual values
of “autonomy, consent, and self-determination,” such that arbitral agreements
must be strictly enforced.16 Instead, he argues, the statute aimed to facilitate
access to justice by promoting such core procedural values as “simplicity,
flexibility, and intolerance of technicalities.”17
These efforts to contextualize the FAA are significant contributions to
our understanding of the social meaning and purposes of the statute—ones
that serve to complicate and unsettle now dominant views. But if we step
back even further and examine them together, rather than in isolation,
another possibility emerges for contextualizing the rise of modern arbitration
law and practice—namely, decentering the FAA itself. Our focus today is on
13 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 987-991 (1999).
14 See id. at 992-94.
15 See Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1939,
1964-90 (2014); SZALAI, supra note 11, at 26-27, 168-73.
16 Aragaki, supra note 15, at 1941.
17 Id. at 1943.
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the FAA because, especially after the U.S. Supreme Court held that it
preempted state law,18 the statute has become central to shaping our current
arbitration landscape. But ironically, to take the FAA as both the starting and
focal point of the history of modern arbitration law and practice serves to
naturalize the expansive vision of the statute that the court itself has imposed
through its relatively recent jurisprudence. If we pull back the lens sufficiently
far, the FAA suddenly appears as one among many contemporary efforts, not
only to promote arbitration, but also to remake the state and its institutions
in the early twentieth century—all with an eye toward addressing the myriad
new challenges of modern, urban, industrial life. And key among these was,
of course, the burgeoning administrative state. Might the growing power of
the administrative state, a familiar set piece of U.S. legal history, be a relevant
context for examining the rise of modern arbitration law and practice,
including—but also extending well beyond—the FAA itself?
As it turns out, in the early decades of the twentieth century, a wide range
of contemporary commentators regularly drew parallels between the spread
of arbitration and the growth of administrative agencies. Consider, as just one
example, the highly influential Roscoe Pound, longtime dean of the Harvard
Law School and an early, leading advocate of procedural and judicial reform.
A longstanding proponent of arbitration, Pound joined the advisory council
of the newly established American Arbitration Association (AAA) in 1926. In
letters that he exchanged that fall with then president of the AAA Lucius
Eastman, Pound observed that there were many advocates of arbitration who
viewed it as a solution to the ills of modern industrial society, hoping to see
it “replace the law of the land” or “become our everyday resource for social
control.”19 On this view, arbitration was emerging alongside administrative
agencies as part of a broader series of efforts to substitute for the many
inadequacies of the formal court system. As Pound commented, the present
moment was characterized by a proliferation of “minute legislation,
multiplication of administrative powers and standards, and an increased
resort to arbitration.”20 Among their commonalities, in his view, was that such
responses sought to infuse substantial discretion into decision-making
processes, and were thus all “in the direction of an individualized treatment
of particular cases[,] dealing with each case as if it were unique and of no
relation to any other.”21

18 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that the FAA preempted a
California law invalidating certain FAA-protected arbitration agreements).
19 Letter from Roscoe Pound to Lucius R. Eastman (November 11, 1926), in CIVIL WAR:
AMERICAN LEGAL MANUSCRIPTS FROM THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL LIBRARY (Proquest database).
20 Id.
21 Id.
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As Pound and other observers noted, both arbitration tribunals and
administrative agencies were institutions that, while deeply rooted in history,
were then experiencing a remarkable resurgence as responses to the
challenges of modern industrial society. More particularly, both arbitration
and administrative adjudication provided much-needed alternatives to the
formal court system and its adversarial procedures. Traditional court
procedure was criticized as exceedingly slow and inaccessible, placing the
entire weight of factual investigation on the parties and their lawyers and thus
exacerbating the injustices that stemmed from rampant socio-economic
inequality. What was needed, many believed, was more streamlined
procedures that would enable decision-makers to attend more to substantive
justice and less to procedural technicalities. Such procedures would endow
decision-makers with significant discretion, including to pursue factual
investigation. And these decision-makers, in turn, would have relevant nonlegal expertise, enabling them to exercise their discretion in ways that ensured
more accurate and efficient dispute resolution. Both arbitration and
administrative adjudication were widely thought to be forms of procedure
that shared these key characteristics. Indeed, the parallels between the two
were such that agency adjudication—and, in particular, what the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 would later classify as “informal
adjudication”—might itself be described as a form of arbitration.22
From this perspective, arbitration was not, as is now commonly supposed,
a mode of private ordering, enabling parties to resolve their dispute in private
and in accordance with their own contractualized preferences. Rather than an
effort to retreat from the state, arbitration was instead viewed by many as a
tool for remaking and thereby strengthening state institutions. But while there
was widespread agreement that arbitration was intimately connected to a
broader project of state-building, views as to how exactly such arbitration was
to be conducted—by whom and toward what ends—varied widely. It is only
by looking well beyond the FAA, reading across multiple sources, produced in
multiple institutional contexts, that we can begin to capture the extent of the
contemporary enthusiasm for arbitration as a mode of public governance. A
complete account of these contexts and sources lies well beyond the scope of
these pages. But a brief overview should suffice to demonstrate the nature and
depth of the contemporary commitment to deploying arbitration in service of
a broader program of improved governance.
22 The various ways in which contemporaries drew parallels between arbitration and agency
adjudication are detailed below. See text accompanying infra notes 26–30, 38–41, 45–50, 59–64. See
also WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 8, 21, 40-42, 53
(1929) (describing the turn to both administrative adjudication and arbitration and conciliation as
efforts to develop alternatives to the formal court system); EWING COCKRELL, SUCCESSFUL
JUSTICE 1-16, 610, 618 (1939) (same).
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II. CORPORATIST MODELS
An important set of arguments for arbitration as a mode of public
governance, akin to (and intertwined with) administrative agency
adjudication, stemmed from the early twentieth-century enthusiasm for
corporatism, or state-coordinated, group self-governance. Across the political
spectrum, a broad range of business leaders, economists, and policymakers
argued that the new challenges posed by modern industrial society required
a rejection of classical liberalism’s individualist model of social and political
organization and an embrace instead of a more group-based or corporatist
model. Corporatist thought and experimentation never took as deep root or
departed as much from core liberal principles as was the case in contemporary
Europe, where fascist regimes came into power and more left-leaning models
(like guild socialism in Britain) also made some inroads.23 But corporatist
discourse was, nonetheless, commonplace in the contemporary United States
and had some meaningful purchase in practice. Such arguments were
advanced by right-leaning business interests eager to thwart burgeoning
regulatory efforts, as well as by more left-leaning thinkers and policymakers
searching for ways to attend more fully to the needs of labor (even while
eschewing radical redistribution). And central to all these corporatist projects
was arbitration—envisioned as a tool that was vital for helping to establish
and maintain forms of state-coordinated, group self-governance.
The corporatist conception of arbitration advanced by business interests
was articulated most forcefully by Clarence F. Birdseye in a book entitled
Arbitration and Business Ethics: A Study of the History and Philosophy of Various
Types of Arbitration and Their Relations to Business Ethics. Published in 1926, the
book was widely reviewed and came to be regularly cited in contemporary
publications, becoming a standard point of reference in discussions of
(especially commercial) arbitration.24 As a “corporation lawyer with a large
practice,” Birdseye was particularly interested in the use of arbitration to

23 See, e.g., HOWARD J. WIARDA, CORPORATISM AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS: THE
OTHER GREAT “ISM” 18-19, 34-43, 134-39 (1996); CHARLES S. MAIER, RECASTING BOURGEOIS
EUROPE: STABILIZATION IN FRANCE, GERMANY, AND ITALY IN THE DECADE AFTER WORLD
WAR I 3-15, 353-54, 579-94 (1975); James Q. Whitman, Of Corporatism, Fascism, and the First New
Deal, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 747, 749-51 (1991).
24 See, e.g., Martin Gang, 15 CAL. L. REV. 76, 76-77 (1926) (reviewing CLARENCE F.
BIRSDSEYE, ARBITRATION AND BUSINESS ETHICS (1926)); J. Kent Greene, 13 A.B.A. J. 35 (1927)
(reviewing CLARENCE F. BIRSDSEYE, ARBITRATION AND BUSINESS ETHICS (1926)); Paul L.
Sayre, 2 IND. L. J. 352, 352-55 (1927) (reviewing CLARENCE F. BIRSDSEYE, ARBITRATION AND
BUSINESS ETHICS (1926)); JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, SUPPLEMENT TO SECOND EDITION OF
THE TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE 18 n.1 (1934) (citing
CLARENCE F. BIRSDSEYE, ARBITRATION AND BUSINESS ETHICS (1926)).
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resolve business-related disputes.25 That said, as suggested by its subtitle, his
book ranged widely, considering “Various Types of Arbitration.” Two of the
book’s key premises were that arbitration and administrative agency
adjudication were functionally akin and that both were experiencing a
renaissance as tools thought to facilitate the remaking of the state along
corporatist lines.
According to Birdseye, administrative agency adjudication was a subset of
the broader category of arbitration. As he put it, such adjudication was
“Official Administrative Arbitration by Nonjudicial Functionaries.”26 Like
arbitration, administrative agency adjudication was a means of resolving
disputes by relying on non-legally trained individuals with relevant expertise
in the matter at hand, rather than on generalist lawyer-judges. In his words,
“well-qualified citizens, who are not members of the judiciary, but who are
presumed to be well acquainted with local customs and rules—experts
therein—are designated by the statutes to act in a judicial capacity, and often
as judge, jury and sheriff.”27 While noting that administrative agency
adjudication dated back many centuries, Birdseye suggested that the
conditions of mass industrial society were serving greatly to expand the need
for such “arbitration by official nonjudicial arbitrators.”28 As he explained,
there was a new “tendency” that could be “seen in this country”—namely, the
conferral of “quasi judicial powers . . . on our insurance, banking and other
departments.”29 But properly understood, the development of new bureaus
and commissions with adjudicatory authority was “only an extension to
bureaucracy of the fundamental principle of commercial arbitration—that a
permanent tribunal of fair minded experts is the natural and necessary forum
to decide technical questions with which they are thoroughly familiar.”30
As this suggests, Birdseye believed that the model of “commercial
arbitration . . . [as] a permanent tribunal of fair minded experts” was
applicable well beyond commercial disputes as such. It was best understood as
an ideal type, designating a mode of arbitration practice that might be applied
in any and all intra-group disputes. Surveying the contemporary landscape,
Birdseye insisted that the era was defined by a pervasive tendency to organize
into groups—one that was “not peculiar to business, but is a part of a great
25 Otis Notman, More Lawyers Who Write Books: Mr. Birdseye of ‘Revised Statutes’ Fame, N.Y.
TIMES, April 6, 1907, at BR224.
26 CLARENCE F. BIRDSEYE, ARBITRATION AND BUSINESS ETHICS: A STUDY OF THE
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF VARIOUS TYPES OF ARBITRATION AND THEIR RELATIONS TO
BUSINESS ETHICS 151 (1926).
27 Id. at 152.
28 Id. at 151.
29 Id. at 153.
30 Id.
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national movement to organize and suborganize, which characterizes the age
and is plainly discernible in the religious and club life of the country.”31 In his
telling, such groups arose as an attempt to temper the excesses of liberal
individualist competition, which had worked to the detriment of all. More
particularly, groups required their members to abide by common standards,
thus reasserting group norms as against forms of individual self-interest that
might threaten intra-communal and social peace. And crucially, these
standards were enforced internally—within the group itself—through
arbitration. On this view, the corporatist restructuring of society, which
ensured that “the better conditions of the new collectivism” would replace “the
evils of the older individualism,” hinged on practices of arbitration.32
With an eye toward quelling pervasive labor unrest, Birdseye argued that
the medieval guild epitomized the ideal type of commercial arbitration. The
guild-based model presumed that the interests of capital and labor were
fundamentally the same and called on industrialists, as leaders of the
community of industry, to guide workers through arbitration to recognize
that their own interests were in fact those of their employers. More
particularly, industrialists would encourage workers to view themselves as
(subsidiary) participants in a common industrial community, thereby
ensuring not only labor’s well-being, but also its quietude: “Some degree of
self-government sobers and satisfies the employees and makes them more
conservative in their views and demands, and more reasonableness is
engendered on both sides.”33 As for where this left the state, Birdseye made
clear that the state’s administrative apparatus would continue to expand so as
to provide much-needed guidance in addressing the challenges of industrial
modernity. But this apparatus would be firmly in the hands of business
interests—a logical entailment, he implied, of the fact that administrative
agency adjudication was itself just a form of “commercial arbitration.”
Business interests, moreover, were not the only ones who pointed to the
parallels between arbitration and administrative agency adjudication and who
did so in service of a corporatist project of state building. More left-leaning
institutional economists—including especially University of Wisconsin
professor John Commons and his students—also propounded a corporatist
model of arbitration, but with different goals in mind. On their view, such a
model would simultaneously promote the interests of labor and ensure the
continued survival of capitalism. In no way radical, these men argued that an
arbitration-backed model of “constitutional government in industry” would

31
32
33

Id. at 10.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 129.
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offer a third way between relatively unmediated capitalism (of the sort
appealing to Birdseye and his ilk) and more radical socialist alternatives.34
Commons and his acolytes shared Birdseye’s view that the early
twentieth-century was characterized by the rapid emergence of new forms of
group-based organization—particularly in the sphere of capital-labor
relations. So too, and again like Birdseye, they insisted that such group-based
organizations were arising in response to the challenges of modern industrial
capitalism and that they were characterized by the embrace of arbitration as
a tool of self-governance—one that would help to address the growing
number of industrial conflicts pitting capital against labor. But while Birdseye
framed these developments as a return backward in time to the model of the
medieval guild, Commons conceived of the directionality of history in very
different terms. In Commons’s telling, the contemporary enthusiasm for
arbitration-backed, group self-governance was forward-looking in nature—
the end point of enlightened social and political modernity. More particularly,
he described these trends—including especially the development of
arbitration-backed collective bargaining agreements—as an offshoot of the
modern emergence of ideals of democratic, constitutional government or, as
he put it, the rise of “constitutional government in industry.”35
Within this emerging model of industrial self-governance, arbitrators
served the vital role of the judiciary. As detailed by Commons’s student,
William Leiserson, himself a prominent economist, collective bargaining
agreements functioned as the constitutions of industrial communities and
“the vast majority of [these] . . . now provide for arbitrators to be called in”
to resolve disputes arising over the agreements’ interpretation.36 Serving as a
neutral outsider or “third party,” the arbitrator—like a judge in the political
state—was able to provide a trusted, objective resolution to the dispute.37 But
though a neutral outsider, the arbitrator was chosen by group insiders and
bound to adhere to the group’s constitution and laws, thus ensuring that such
arbitration constituted a form of internal self-governance.
In line with the contemporary tendency to equate arbitration and
administrative agency adjudication, Leiserson—again like Birdseye—drew
important parallels between his ideal of arbitration and the burgeoning
administrative state. More particularly, Leiserson specified that effective
industrial arbitration was a form of judicial machinery that was more akin to
administrative agency adjudication than to traditional court-based, judicial

34 See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
35 JOHN R. COMMONS, TRADE UNIONISM AND LABOR PROBLEMS 1 (1905).
36 William M. Leiserson, Constitutional Government in American Industries, 12 AM. ECON. REV.

56, 64 (1922, Supplement).
37 Id. at 63.
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processes. Industrial arbitrators, he asserted, “saw the[ir] duties . . . as much
the same as those of a Workmen’s Compensation Board or a Public Utilities
Commission.”38 Pointing to John E. Williams, who had served as an arbitrator
in the much-discussed New York cloak and suit industry strike that erupted
in 1914, Leiserson argued that Williams conceived of his role as “quasijudicial, partaking both of a court and an administrative officer.”39 Like
someone conducting administrative agency adjudication, Williams
understood himself to be endowed with the discretion to disregard procedural
and evidentiary technicalities and to pursue substantive justice instead. In
Leiserson’s words, he sought “to get the real truth in industrial cases, which
as in ordinary law cases are [sic] often hidden by the trial.”40
In thus emphasizing the similarities between industrial arbitration and
administrative agency adjudication, Leiserson drew in part on his own
experience working in the Wisconsin Industrial Commission that Commons
had helped to establish in 1911. As Commons and his students understood the
role of the commission (and more generally, that of the rapidly expanding
administrative state), it was to assist in the efforts of business and labor to
engage in industrial self-governance, providing vital guidance and
coordination, including not least through fact-finding, investigatory
support.41 From this perspective, industrial arbitration conducted by private
business and labor entities, on the one hand, and administrative agency
adjudication pursued by government officials, on the other, operated in much
the same fashion and with many of the same goals—through expert oversight
aimed at facilitating industrial self-governance.42 Accordingly, much like
Birdseye—though with different goals in mind—Commons and his students
advanced a broader agenda of arbitration-backed group self-governance

Id. at 65 n.8.
Id.
Id.
See DONALD W. ROGERS, MAKING CAPITALISM SAFE: WORK SAFETY AND HEALTH
REGULATION IN AMERICA, 1880–1940, at 48-49 (2009); WILLIAM J. BREEN, LABOR MARKET
POLITICS AND THE GREAT WAR: THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THE STATES, AND THE FIRST
U.S. EMPLOYMENT SERVICE, 1907–1933, at 122 (1997).
42 It bears emphasis that even while focusing on labor relations, Commons and Leiserson
viewed arbitration as a kind of umbrella procedure, such that much could also be learned from
developments pertaining to the arbitration of commercial disputes. As they saw it, business’s
embrace of commercial arbitration provided a model for labor arbitration. In an article co-authored
with fellow economist Edward W. Morehouse in 1927, Commons bemoaned the fact that courts were
thus far unwilling to enforce “arbitration awards under ‘contracts’ between unions and employers’
associations.” John R. Commons and E. W. Morehouse, Legal and Economic Job Analysis, 37 YALE L.
J. 139, 178 n.67 (1927). Such awards, the authors suggested, ought to be treated with the same judicial
solicitousness as that being increasingly shown to those rendered in commercial disputes: “Should
not the courts allow to extra-judicial adjustment of labor relations at least the same freedom from
legal consequences that is increasingly allowed in the arbitration of commercial relations?” Id. at 178.
38
39
40
41
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pursuant to which private ordering would ultimately serve to remake social
organization and public authority.
It bears emphasis, moreover, that the embrace of arbitration as the
foundation of a new corporatist form of governance was not confined to the
writings of theorists. Herbert Hoover’s project of advancing an “associative
state,” astutely identified by Van Wezel Stone as an important context for
the enactment of the FAA, was itself a significant outgrowth of this
corporatist discourse. So too, the brief-lived establishment of the National
Industrial Recovery Administration during the First New Deal borrowed in
key respects from this broader, corporatist vision, and in so doing, gave pride
of place to arbitration.43
Enacted in 1933, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) sought to
establish a new cooperative regime in which business and labor worked with
one another to develop a stable, less competitive environment. More
particularly, the statute directed business and labor interests to create codes
of fair competition, thus delegating major self-regulatory power to private
industry. Negotiated within and tailored to particular industries, the codes
set minimum wages and maximum hours and encouraged various forms of
price stabilization. Each code, moreover, was directly administered by a code
authority that was supposed to consist of representatives of business, labor,
and the public.44 At the same time, the system as a whole was overseen by a
newly established federal administrative agency: the National Recovery
Administration (NRA).45 Informed by a corporatist logic of industrial selfgovernance, the NIRA experiment assumed that business and labor would
voluntarily cooperate in designing and complying with the new codes. Such
cooperation was, however, to be fostered and sustained through practices of
arbitration, as well as by modes of administrative agency adjudication (or
“adjustment”) that were all but indistinguishable from arbitration.
The NRA and code authorities were charged with pursuing the
“adjustment” of disputes over whether a code violation had occurred. More
particularly, the NRA Manual for the Adjustment of Complaints specified that,
when conflicts over alleged code violations arose, the first step toward

43 See generally DONALD R. BRAND, CORPORATISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: A STUDY OF
THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION (1988); Whitman, supra note 23.
44 See BRAND, supra note 43, at 99-116. In practice, as the codes were actually drafted, the code

authorities came to be dominated almost entirely by business interests, thus giving little, if any voice
to labor. See CHARLES L. DEARING ET AL., THE ABC OF THE NRA 94 (1934) (“The code authority
is usually composed of members of the industry . . . .”); Theda Skocpol, Political Response to Capitalist
Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal, 10 POL. & SOC’Y 155, 178-79
(1980) (explaining that labor lacked meaningful representation on code authorities).
45 See BRAND, supra note 43, at 81-95.
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resolution was to assist with fact-finding.46 Since many conflicts were
assumed to arise from misunderstandings, such findings of fact—ideally
issued through the auspices of the code authority and thus harnessing “the
pressure of opinion within the Industry”—were thought often to be sufficient
to secure adjustment.47 But when more was needed, the manual
recommended “adjustment . . . by conciliation, mediation, and arbitration,”
without distinguishing in any way between these procedures.48 Thereafter, it
indicated simply that “at any stage in the adjustment of any complaint,” the
code authority or NRA officials “may seek to induce the parties to arbitrate.”49
The nascent American Arbitration Association (AAA) took heed of this
guidance. Established in 1926, the AAA was still struggling to survive well
into the 1930s. Recognizing in the NIRA regime a potentially valuable
opportunity to reimagine its functions and fortunes, the association
successfully negotiated with NRA officials for the insertion of arbitration
provisions into the codes—including, not surprisingly, provisions that
required the use of AAA rules and/or staff. The end result was to promulgate
AAA-based arbitration in ways that proved to be a significant boon to the
association at a time when its existence remained precarious, thus
contributing to its ultimately successful efforts to position itself as the
country’s preeminent general purpose arbitration provider.50 In all these
respects, the NIRA regime was the apotheosis of contemporary corporatist
aspirations: Seeking seamlessly to blend the administrative state and
industrial self-governance, it called on an inchoate mix of informal agency
adjudication and arbitration.
III. THE MATERNALIST MODEL
Alongside these various corporatist models for deploying arbitration as a
tool of public governance, there emerged another model that, while also
premised on the parallels between arbitration and administrative agency

46 See NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION, MANUAL FOR THE ADJUSTMENT OF
COMPLAINTS BY STATE DIRECTORS AND CODE AUTHORITIES 28-29 (1934) (describing the
procedure of handling complaints by an “Industrial Adjustment Agency”).
47 Id. at 8.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 29. In practice, the details of adjustment and arbitration were sometimes further
specified in individual codes, and there was substantial variability among these. See FRANCES
KELLOR, ARBITRATION IN THE NEW INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 181-94 (1934) (describing variations
among code authorities).
50 See Report from Lucius R. Eastman, President, Am. Arb. Ass’n 2 (1933) (on file with author);
Report of the Arbitration Committee 1 (detailing the AAA’s successful efforts to include arbitration
provisions within the codes and the opportunities thereby afforded the association further to develop
and expand).

2416

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 2401

adjudication, pursued different ends. This was what we might call a
“maternalist” model of arbitration.
During the Progressive Era, white upper- and middle-class women
reformers advanced what scholars have described as a project of maternalist
state-building, aimed at assisting poor (often immigrant) working women and
their children. These reformers managed to secure the enactment of a great
deal of protective legislation. But in addition, relying on the remarkable
porousness of the American state, they succeeded in funding and establishing
a number of administrative agencies—including, most famously, the federal
Children’s Bureau.51 Within this broader project of maternalist state-building,
there emerged a maternalist model of agency-based arbitration.
In pursuing this policy-making agenda, as well as their own
empowerment, women reformers justified their demands and their own
claimed expertise by virtue of their identity as women and thus as (actual or
potential) mothers. More particularly, reformers drew on the then dominant
ideology of separate spheres, which depicted women as innately suited to the
private, domestic sphere of home and family, to argue that women possessed
a distinctively moral and nurturing, maternal nature. On this view, women
were endowed with a unique capacity and responsibility to pursue legal and
social reforms in the interests of the many poor women and children
struggling under the conditions of modern, urban industrial life.52 This
maternalist program of state-building was rooted in the urban settlement
houses that were established by elite white women in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries to assist the many thousands of new immigrants
then flooding into the country. Reformers utilized the settlement house as a
home base from which to pursue a program of socially oriented research and
reform, and in so doing, laid claim to a domain of feminine expertise in
household management that justified their efforts to teach immigrant
women how to manage their own homes and families.53 But as they
researched the social structures sustaining urban poverty and crime,
reformers came to believe that attending properly to the needs of immigrant
51 See, e.g., THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL
ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 312-524 (1992) (explaining the origins of
child welfare policy); ROBYN MUNCY, CREATING A FEMALE DOMINION IN AMERICAN REFORM
1890-1935, at 38-65 (1991) (describing the creation of the Children’s Bureau). Although there is
widespread agreement that a significant subset of the policy-making efforts pursued by elite white
women in this period can and should be described as “maternalist,” there has been much debate
about the precise parameters of this term. For an overview of this literature, including persistent
debates, see Felicia A. Kornbluh, The New Literature on Gender and the Welfare State: The U.S. Case,
22 FEMINIST STUD. 171 (1996); Molly Ladd Taylor, Toward Defining Maternalism in U.S. History, 5
J. WOMEN’S HIST. 110 (1993).
52 See SKOCPOL, supra note 51, at 321-72; MUNCY, supra note 51, at 36-37, 48.
53 See SKOCPOL, supra note 51, at 343-50; MUNCY, supra note 51, at 3-37.
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women and their children would require them to address causal factors
extending well beyond the sphere of the home, narrowly defined. They thus
turned their attention to the broader municipality (and, in short order, to
the state and nation as a whole), framing this more expansive reach as a form
of “municipal housekeeping.”54
One such reformer was Frances Kellor, a stalwart of the settlement house
movement, who would later go on to become a founding member and the
longtime acting head of the AAA.55 Having long devoted herself to exposing
and preventing the exploitation of the poor (often immigrant) women serving
as domestic workers, Kellor established the New York State Bureau of
Industries and Immigration (BII) in 1910.56 The BII’s mission was to identify
and root out the myriad injustices suffered by immigrants as a whole—a
mission that, in line with the general thrust of maternalist state-building, she
identified as a key “problem of municipal house-keeping.”57 As part of this
same maternalist vision, Kellor designed the agency such that it was able to
call on a broad network of women’s groups to provide much-needed lobbying
and investigative support.58 So too, in assisting individual immigrant
complainants, the BII adopted a model of dispute resolution that followed
from its broader, maternalist orientation. This model focused on promoting
informal arbitration or conciliation—two procedures that were long viewed
by many as all but interchangeable, especially before later-enacted statutory
reforms made arbitration agreements more readily enforceable.59
Kellor and her supporters viewed the BII as implementing a distinctively
maternalist approach to these procedures—one initially cultivated in the
women’s protective associations that, as detailed by Felice Batlan, emerged in
SKOCPOL, supra note 51, at 333, 337, 529.
See Amalia D. Kessler, Arbitration and Americanization: The Paternalism of Progressive
Procedural Reform, 124 YALE L. J. 2940, 2973-83 (2015) (describing Kellor’s contributions).
56 See JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM,
1860–1925, at 239-41 (2d ed. 1988) (describing Kellor’s work in New York as a public servant);
William Joseph Maxwell, Frances Kellor in the Progressive Era: A Case Study in the
Professionalization of Reform 181-201 (Apr. 22, 1968) (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on
file with author) (describing Kellor’s work in New York and New Jersey); John Press, France Kellor,
Americanization, and the Quest for Participatory Democracy 69-90 (2009) (Ph.D. dissertation, New
York University) (on file with author) (describing Kellor’s contributions to “Americanization”).
57 The Immigrant Woman, A M. H EBREW & JEWISH M ESSENGER, June 16, 1916, at 184
(quoting Kellor).
58 In December 1909, Kellor created a local New York Committee of the North American Civic
League for Immigrants (NACL), which was extended to New Jersey in 1911. Kellor worked to
intertwine this committee with the BII, using the private organization to provide extensive staffing
and funding to the state agency. See HIGHAM, supra note 56, at 240; Press, supra note 56, at 70-80.
The New York-New Jersey Committee, in turn, developed extensive networks of support through
its connections with women’s groups, which were thus made available to the BII. See Amalia D.
Kessler, A Maternalist Model of Arbitration (unpublished book chapter) (on file with author).
59 See Kessler, Arbitration and Americanization, supra note 55, at 2956-61.
54
55
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the late nineteenth century as the earliest legal aid societies.60 From the
perspective of Kellor and her allies, this maternalist model was defined in
antithesis to the informal arbitration or conciliation that was becoming
increasingly popular within newer, male-dominated legal aid societies and
local municipal courts. As argued by the author and social reformer Kate
Halladay Claghorn, these male-dominated entities pursued a highly legalistic
mode of dispute resolution, focused only on claims cognizable in law. But this
legalistic approach negated the very possibility of achieving a lasting and
meaningful settlement, since such a settlement was possible only where those
overseeing the proceedings had gained a complete, fully contextualized
understanding of the parties and their dispute. As Claghorn observed:
The legal-aid society follows the modern court in laying emphasis on
conciliation and arbitration. But how can these be effected if the personal
peculiarities of clients and their opponents are not taken into account?
Conciliation and arbitration depend upon persuasion, upon the voluntary cooperation of the parties in interest, not upon the sanctions of the law. The
parties must be approached on the basis of their own feelings and prejudices
about the matter in hand. How can this be done if the differences are not
thought important and are not seen?61

On this view, it was women reformers like Kellor, who excelled qua women
in the arts of listening and care—as demonstrated by, among other things,
their contemporary development of the burgeoning new field of social work.
As such, it was they who were best able to design effective modes of
arbitration and conciliation.
The BII’s maternalist approach to informal arbitration or conciliation
therefore began with an effort to gather the claimant’s entire story. Having
done so, the agency would then order “a hearing . . . in the hope of bringing
the parties together, clearing their minds and getting them to adjust the
matter.”62 In true maternalist fashion, the ultimate goal of such adjustment
was not only to resolve the dispute, but also to attend to the immigrant’s full
range of social and material needs. Toward this end, the BII connected
immigrants with various individuals and entities able to provide such
assistance. As reported by the New York Tribune in May 1912, Kellor
explained in her capacity as BII chief that “‘[t]he Bureau of Industries and
Immigration not only does what it can . . . to right wrongs and secure justice,
but often directs aliens to such charitable persons as will enable them to
60 See generally FELICE BATLAN, WOMEN AND JUSTICE FOR THE POOR: A HISTORY OF
LEGAL AID, 1863-1945 (2015); Kessler, A Maternalist Model, supra note 58.
61 KATE HOLLADAY CLAGHORN, THE IMMIGRANT’S DAY IN COURT 473 (1923).
62 N.Y. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF INDUSTRIES AND
IMMIGRATION FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1911, at 124 (1912).

2021]

Reflections on the Nexus of Procedure and History

2419

continue on their journey after they have parted with their last funds.’”63 In
its eagerness thus to do justice, the article suggested, the BII had taken on
the character of its leader. It was, in short, all but an extension of Kellor
herself—someone who epitomized “the burning, courageous enthusiasm of
a modern woman in action.”64
IV. THE COURT-BASED MODEL
Legal elites in the early twentieth century also embraced arbitration as a
tool of public governance. In so doing, they shared the widely expressed view
that there were important parallels between arbitration and administrative
agency adjudication. But as was true of Roscoe Pound, among others, they
tended to be far less enthusiastic about this development.65 Unlike their
contemporaries who adopted models of arbitration that were intimately
connected to the burgeoning administrative state, lawyers as a whole
preferred to look to the profession’s traditional bastion of state-based
authority—namely, the courts. It was within the (lawyer-controlled) courts
that many lawyers sought to develop an approach to arbitration that would
address the myriad new challenges of modern industrial society.
Anxious to ensure their own continued preeminence, legal elites urged
the cabining of both administrative agency adjudication and arbitration
through lawyer-wielded rules and procedures. Yet, even while working to
contain these arenas of discretion, they sought to expand the discretion that
they themselves enjoyed within the courtroom—and in so doing, to position
themselves so as better to compete in responding to the challenges of
modernity. Toward this end, reform-minded lawyers argued that rigid,
legislatively enacted codes of procedure, adopted on the model of New York’s
Field Code, ought to be replaced by new procedural rules crafted in a more
flexible, ongoing fashion by judges themselves. This program of reform was
initially implemented in local municipal courts, several decades before the
enactment of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934. Indeed, though largely
forgotten today, many of the procedural innovations that eventually made
their way into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were first attempted
63 A Good Samaritan for Hapless Alien Hosts is Miss Frances A. Kellor, N.Y. TRIBUNE, May 12,
1912, at A4.
64 Id.
65 As is well known, Pound’s views of the administrative state were mixed—but over time, his
animosity toward it grew. See, e.g., JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS:
HIDDEN HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LAW 211-78 (2007). Similarly, as concerns arbitration, he
expressed doubts. Even while observing that “I have . . . a great deal of faith in commercial
arbitration” and “have advocated it vigorously and consistently,” he made a point of cautioning that
arbitration could not “do the whole work of administering justice,” as many contemporaries seemed
to hope. Pound, supra note 19.
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through municipal-court reform in such cities as Boston, Chicago, Cleveland,
and New York.66 As explained in the definitive treatise on the newly enacted
New York Municipal Court Code, which went into effect in 1915, these
procedural reforms included “[s]implifying the rules and methods of
pleading,” “[e]liminating all technical rules as to joinder of parties and of
causes of action,” and “[a]bolishing technical and useless restrictions upon
judicial power in matters of procedure.”67
Accompanying these now familiar efforts to eliminate procedural
technicalities and empower judges to promote substantive justice were
various attempts to develop systems of arbitration and/or conciliation that
would operate in connection with the municipal court. These arbitration- and
conciliation-based experiments aimed at serving the needs of the urban,
immigrant poor, while also endowing those lawyers serving as judges with
extensive discretionary authority—of the sort increasingly enjoyed by the
non-lawyers who staffed administrative agencies and arbitral tribunals. As
this suggests, Aragaki and Szalai are correct to insist on the important
parallels between arguments for procedural and arbitral reform. However, the
two movements were linked not only conceptually (in the sense that they
pursued many of the same goals), but also institutionally—through the
contemporary campaign for municipal-court reform.
As developed by legal elites in conjunction with, most especially, Jewish
communal leaders eager to assist (and Americanize) recent Jewish immigrants
from Eastern Europe, various such arbitration- and conciliation-based
experiments—linked in different ways to the local municipal courts—were
attempted. Key among these was the Jewish Court of Arbitration, which was
founded in New York City in 1919.68 Continuing in operation until the mid1980s, the court resolved (without charge) many thousands of disputes, thus
having a significant impact on the lives of many.69 Although its immediate
66 See, e.g., Robert Wyness Millar, Notabilia of American Civil Procedure, 1887-1937, 50 HARV.
L. REV. 1017, 1035 n.92, 1063-64 (1937) (observing that notice pleading originated in the Municipal
Court of Chicago and referencing Massachusetts reforms); Rasmus S. Saby, Simplified Procedure in
Municipal Court, 18 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 760, 766-68 (1924) (describing reforms in Chicago and
Cleveland); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1055-62
(1982) (mentioning the New York reforms).
67 EDGAR J. LAUER, THE NEW PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK UNDER THE MUNICIPAL COURT CODE 59-60 (1922).
68 The court was renamed the Jewish Conciliation Court of America in 1930 as part of an effort
to distance itself from a competitor, rather than because of any change in its practice. See Amalia D.
Kessler, The Jewish Conciliation Court as the “Official Arbitrating Organ” of the State-Run Courts
(unpublished book chapter) (on file with author).
69 See Joseph Kary, Judgments of Peace: Montreal’s Jewish Arbitration Courts, 1914-1976, 56 AM. J.
LEG. HIST. 436, 443-49 (2016) (describing the history of the court); Tehila Sagy, What’s So Private
About Private Ordering?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 923, 933-34 (2011) (explaining the origins and
practice of the court); JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 83-88 (1983) (“[The court]
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aim was to aid and Americanize recently immigrated Lower East Side Jews,
it participated in a broader campaign for arbitration that extended well
beyond the Jewish community alone. The court engaged actively with (and
obtained recognition from) the leaders of the AAA and successfully deployed
arbitration (and conciliation) in service of the contemporary movement to
remake the local courts.
It was the Jewish Court’s executive secretary, Louis Richman, who took
the lead in working to connect the institution to then widespread efforts to
promote arbitration. He regularly communicated with others who were
actively involved in promoting arbitration and conciliation, including some
who played a leading role in the development of modern commercial
arbitration. Among these were Frances Kellor and Moses H. Grossman, a
former municipal-court judge who went on to help establish the AAA,
alongside Kellor.70 Richman’s efforts to position the Jewish Court as
participating in a broader arbitration movement gained some traction, as
suggested by the fact that The Arbitration Journal—a periodical issued by the
AAA and edited by Kellor—published a number of pieces on the court as part
of its effort to track developments in the field as a whole.71 Indeed, in line
with this vision of itself as a participant in the broader arbitration movement,
the Jewish Court in the mid- to late-1930s went so far as seriously to
contemplate becoming a general purpose arbitration provider, akin to the
AAA—including, not least, by shedding its sectarian, Jewish identity.72
In thus positioning itself within a broader campaign to promote
arbitration (and conciliation), the Jewish Court actively sought to enmesh
itself with and thereby remake the state-run court system. As this suggests,
it embraced a profoundly public-oriented, governmental conception of
arbitration. Although the court was founded by a private act of incorporation
and obtained its funds from private charitable donations contributed by local
Jewish local elites, it engaged in highly public proceedings that were linked
in various ways to those of the local, state-run courts. It relied extensively on
sitting state-court judges, who served as arbitrators and conciliators (in ways
that would violate today’s rules of judicial ethics).73 And for decades, it held

resolved thousands of disputes, and was sufficiently active to justify establishment of branch offices
in scattered Jewish neighborhoods throughout the city.”).
70 Grossman also served as chair of the New York County Lawyers Association’s Committee
on Arbitration and Conciliation. See N.Y. County Lawyers Committees, 5 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N BULL.
369, 370 (1933).
71 Louis Richman, Justice Amongst Themselves, 1 ARB. J. 357, 357-59 (1937); Work of Jewish
Conciliation Court Grows, 2 ARB. J. 130, 130 (1938).
72 See Kessler, The Jewish Conciliation Court, supra note 68.
73 See id.; CHARLES E. GEYH & W. WILLIAM HODES, REPORTERS’ NOTES TO THE MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 73 (2009) (“Rule 3.9: Service as Arbitrator or Mediator. A judge
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its proceedings in public courthouses—in the view of a great many spectators.
So too, the leading lawyers and state-court judges who served on the Jewish
Court and otherwise helped to run the organization were deeply involved in
the ongoing project of local court reform, aiming to develop new procedural
and institutional mechanisms that would provide more meaningful access to
justice to the urban immigrant poor. These reformers worked within both the
Jewish Court and the state-run courts, drawing little, if any distinction
between the two and using the one as a laboratory in which to develop
approaches that might then be transplanted to the other. As just one example,
the Jewish Court and its personnel played a key role in the emergence in 1933
of the New York Domestic Relations Court, which was widely heralded as the
embodiment of the modern ideal of the socialized court.74 The Jewish Court,
in fact, developed a relationship with the state-run courts that was so close
and interconnected that it became possible, at least for a time, to envision it
as an official state entity in its own right—or what its leaders described as
“the official arbitrating organ of the [state-run] Courts.”75 In all these respects,
the court afforded a type of arbitration that was far removed from the now
dominant model of private ordering.
CONCLUSION
As these examples suggest, the early decades of the twentieth century
witnessed a flourishing of models of arbitration that were not directly
connected to the enactment of the FAA and that bear little, if any resemblance
to the now reigning paradigm of arbitration as a mode of private ordering.
Pursuant to these models, arbitration was a tool of public governance—one
widely viewed as parallel in nature and function to the adjudicatory apparatus
of the then flourishing administrative state. Indeed, some models of
arbitration took the form of efforts to advance new types of administrative
agency adjudication. And while legal elites preferred a model of arbitration
that was rooted in the courts, rather than administrative agencies, they too
developed the procedure in ways that aimed to serve key public functions—
akin to, and interconnected with, those of public court proceedings.
shall not act as an arbitrator or a mediator or perform other judicial functions apart from the judge’s
official duties unless expressly authorized by law.”).
74 See Kessler, The Jewish Conciliation Court, supra note 68. On the New York Domestic
Relations Court of 1933, see Elizabeth D. Katz, Criminal Law in a Civil Guise: The Evolution of Family
Courts and Support Laws, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1241, 1280-83 (2019) (summarizing the court’s origins
and function). On the ideal of the socialized court, see generally MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF
COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO (2003).
75 Report of Louis Richman, Executive Secretary of the Jewish Conciliation Court of America,
Inc., Rendered at Its Annual Meeting (Jan. 10, 1934) (on file with the Israel Goldstein Papers
(Collection A364), Central Zionist Archives, File 271b).
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The precise nature of the relationship between these different models of
arbitration and the enactment of the FAA remains to be detailed, though it
bears emphasis that there is evidence of interconnections between the various
individuals and interests pressing for each.76 So too, we are left with the
question of how these different models developed and changed over time,
giving rise by mid-century to the now dominant view of arbitration as a form
of private ordering. But however important, these matters extend well beyond
the scope of these pages. My goal here has been more limited—namely, to
highlight the new lines of inquiry made possible by bringing a historical
sensibility to bear as we approach issues of procedure and practice. By reading
widely across multiple sources, produced in multiple institutional contexts—
and by remaining imaginatively open to the strangeness of a not-so-distant
past—we can begin to discern foundations of modern American arbitration
that are far removed from our now settled understandings.

76 Consider, for example, the role played by Charles L. Bernheimer—the chair of the New
York Chamber of Commerce’s Committee on Arbitration and the man widely credited with leading
the chamber’s campaign for the enactment of the FAA—in promoting municipal-court reform,
including not least municipal-court-based arbitration. Bernheimer and his committee actively
lobbied for the inclusion of arbitration provisions within (and the subsequent enactment of) the 1915
New York Municipal Court Code. See Address and Report of William Liebermann in Relation to
the Establishment of a Court of Arbitration by the Kehillah of the City of New York (Apr. 25 & 26,
1914) (on file in the Collection of Judah L. Magnes Papers (P3-1848), Central Archives for the
History of the Jewish People Jerusalem, Hebrew University of Jerusalem) (noting that “[t]he New
York Chamber of Commerce urged the passage of the [code’s] arbitration provisions”). And once
the code was enacted, the chamber and its arbitration committee assisted in developing the rules
required to implement the new arbitration system. These efforts are discussed in the Annual Report
of Committee on Arbitration, in SIXTIETH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CORPORATION OF THE
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FOR THE YEAR 1917–1918, at 6 (1918).
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